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Abstract
The study and analysis of social graphs impacts on a wide range of applications, such as
community decision making support and recommender systems. With the boom of online social
networks, such analyses are benefiting from a massive collection and publication of social graphs
at large scale. Unfortunately, individuals’ privacy right might be inadvertently violated when
publishing this type of data. In this article, we introduce (k, `)-anonymity; a novel privacy measure
aimed at evaluating the resistance of social graphs to active attacks. (k, `)-anonymity is based on
a new problem in Graph Theory, the k-metric antidimension defined as follows.
Let G = (V,E) be a simple connected graph and S = {w1, · · · , wt} ⊆ V an ordered subset of
vertices. The metric representation of a vertex u ∈ V with respect to S is the t-vector r(u|S) =
(dG(u,w1), · · · , dG(u,wt)), where dG(u, v) represents the length of a shortest u − v path in G.
We call S a k-antiresolving set if k is the largest positive integer such that for every vertex
v ∈ V − S there exist other k − 1 different vertices v1, · · · , vk−1 ∈ V − S with r(v|S) = r(v1|S) =
· · · = r(vk−1|S). The k-metric antidimension of G is the minimum cardinality among all the
k-antiresolving sets for G.
We address the k-metric antidimension problem by proposing a true-biased algorithm with
success rate above 80% when considering random graphs of size at most 100. The proposed algo-
rithm is used to determine the privacy guarantees offered by two real-life social graphs with respect
to (k, `)-anonymity. We also investigate theoretical properties of the k-metric antidimension of
graphs. In particular, we focus on paths, cycles, complete bipartite graphs and trees.
Keywords: anonymity, active attack, social network, graph, resolving set, k-metric
antidimension
1. Introduction
Social networking services are widely used in modern society as illustrated by the Alexa’s Top
500 Global Sites statistics1 where facebook and linkedin rank 2nd and 11th respectively in 2014.
∗Corresponding author. Phone: +352 466 644 5458. Fax: 466 644 3 5458. Email: rolando.trujillo@uni.lu
1http://www.alexa.com/topsites
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Such popularity has enabled governments and third-party enterprises to massively collect social
network data, which eventually can be released2 for mining and analysis purposes.
The power of social network analysis is questionless. It might uncover previously unknown
knowledge such as community-based problem, media use, individual engagement, amongst others.
Sociology is a trivial example of a field that certainly benefits from social graphs publication. Many
other fields (e.g., economics, geography, or political science) and systems (e.g., service-oriented
systems, advertisers, or recommended systems) improve their decisions, processes, and services,
based on users interaction.
However, all these benefits are not cost-free. An adversary can compromise users privacy
using the published social network, which results in the disclosure of sensitive data such as e-
mails, instant messages, or relationships. A simple and popular approach to prevent this privacy
problem is anonymization by means of removing potential identifying attributes. Doing so, ag-
gregate knowledge still can be inferred (e.g., connectivity, distance, or node degrees) while the
“who” information has been removed. In practice, however, this naive approach is not enough for
protecting users’ privacy.
What makes social network anonymization a challenging problem is the combination of the
adversary’s background knowledge with the released structure of the network. Considering a
social network as a simple graph, in which individuals are represented by vertices and their bidi-
rectional relationships by edges, the adversary’s background knowledge about a victim may take
many forms, e.g., vertex degrees, connectivity, or local neighborhood. This structural knowledge,
together with the released graph, is often enough to perform passive attacks where the users and
their relationships are re-identified [12].
Other privacy attacks exist. In 2007, Backstrom et al. [1] introduced active attacks based
on the creation and insertion in the network of attacker nodes controlled by the adversary. The
attacker nodes could be either new accounts with pseudonymous or spoofed identities (Sybil
nodes), or legitimate users in the network who collude with the adversary. Attacker nodes establish
links with other nodes in the network (also between themselves) aiming at creating a sort of
fingerprint in the network. Once the social graph is released, the adversary just need to retrieve
such a fingerprint (the attacker nodes) and use it as a hub to re-identify other nodes in the network.
Backstrom et. al. proved that O(
√
log n) attacker nodes in the network can compromise the
privacy of arbitrary targeted nodes with high probability, which makes active attack particularly
dangerous.
1.1. Contribution and plan of the article
Several active attacks to social graphs have been proposed. They could even target random
nodes in the network as recently shown in [15]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no privacy
measure aimed at evaluating the resistance of a social graph to this kind of attack exists. The
lack of such a measure prevents the development of privacy-preserving methods with theoretically
proven privacy guarantees.
In this article we define (k, `)-anonymity ; a privacy measure that can be applied to real-
life social graphs in order to measure their resistance to active attacks. The proposed privacy
2See for example http://snap.stanford.edu/data/
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measure copes with adversaries whose background knowledge concerning a node u and a subset S
of attacker nodes is the metric representation of u with respect to S. (k, `)-anonymity turns out
to be based on a new problem in Graph Theory: the k-metric antidimension. We propose a true-
biased algorithm whose computational complexity and success rate can be adjusted. Empirical
results show that our algorithm finds k-antiresolving basis in random graphs of order at most 100
with a success rate above 80%. Our algorithm has been also used to determine the privacy offered
by two real-life social graphs against active attacks. Finally, we provide theoretical results on the
k-metric antidimension of graphs, such as paths, cycles, complete bipartite graphs and trees.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on
privacy-preserving publication of social network data. Section 3 presents the metric representation
as a reasonable definition of the adversary’s background knowledge. It also introduces the k-metric
antidimension as the basis for the privacy measure (k, `)-anonymity. In Section 4 we present a
true-biased algorithm for computing the k-metric antidimension of a graph, and evaluate the
proposed algorithm through experiments. Preliminary results (mathematical properties) on the
new problem (the k-metric antidimension) are provided in Sections 5 and 6 (the later specifically
addresses the case of tree graphs). Section 7 draws conclusions and future work.
2. Related work
A social graph G = (V,E) is a simple graph where V represents the set of social actors and
E ⊆ V × V their relationships. Both vertices and edges could be enriched with attribute values
such as weights representing trustworthiness or labels providing meaning. We consider, however,
social network data in its most “simplest” form, i.e., a simple graph without further annotation.
Privacy breaches in social networks are mainly categorized in identity disclosure or link dis-
closure [22]. To perform such attacks adversaries rely on background knowledge, which is usually
defined as structural knowledge such as vertex degrees [9] or neighborhoods [28]. The assump-
tions on the adversary’s background knowledge determine the type of privacy attacks and the
corresponding countermeasures.
Privacy-preserving methods for the publication of social graphs are normally based on the well-
known concept k-anonymity [16] adapted to graphs. k-anonymity, initially proposed for microdata,
aims at ensuring that no record in a database can be re-identified with probability higher than
1/k. To do so, identifying attributes should be obviously removed, and any combination of non-
identifying attribute values should not be unique in the database. In practice, not all the attributes
need to be combined, because they do not belong to the adversary’s knowledge. This leads to the
concept of quasi-identifier, that is, an attribute that can be found in external source of information
and, combined with other quasi-identifiers, can uniquely identify a record in the database.
Even though graphs can be represented in tabular form and, thus, graph k-anonymity can
be defined in terms of quasi-identifying attributes [18], graph k-anonymity is typically defined in
terms of structural properties of the graph rather than on attributes. For instance in [6], the
adversary’s background knowledge is defined as a knowledge query Q(x) evaluated for a given
target node of the original graph G. The knowledge query Q(x) allows the creation of a candidate
set consisting of {y ∈ V |Q(x) = Q(y)}. In other words, all the nodes in the network matching the
query Q(.) are equally likely to be the target node x. This simple concept is the basis of several
passive attacks and privacy-preserving methods in the publication of social graphs [9, 28, 30].
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Other privacy notions based on entropy rather than on k-anonymity have been proposed [3].
This type of privacy measure is better suited for methods based on random addition, deletion, or
switching of edges. The perturbation could be made in such a way that the number of edges or
the degree of the vertices are preserved [25, 26]. However, empirical results obtained in [24, 26]
suggest that random obfuscation poorly preserves the topological features of the network.
Passive attacks to social networks can be combined with active attacks. In addition to struc-
tural knowledge, in an active attack the adversary manages to control a subset of nodes (attacker
nodes) of the original graph G [1]. The attacker nodes aim at creating links with their victims
by either identity theft or cloning of existing users profiles [2]. They also establish links between
themselves so as to build a subgraph H of attacker nodes with the following properties: i) H can
be efficiently identified in G and ii) H does not have a non-trivial automorphisms. Once H has
been identified, the adversary is able to re-identify neighbor nodes of H [1] or even arbitrary nodes
in the network [12, 15].
Performing active attacks is not easy, given that there exist several detection mechanisms of
attacker or Sybil nodes in a network [27]. However, such defenses strongly depend on assumptions
on the topological structure of the social network, which does not hold in many real-world sce-
narios [11]. Actually, recent works aim at mitigating, instead of preventing, the impact of Sybil
attacks [20]. Furthermore, a group of users who collude in order to breach the privacy of other
users in the network can be also regarded as attacker nodes.
Other types of active attacks exist. For instance, the maximal vertex coverage (MVC) attack
consists in attacking a few nodes so as to delete as many edges of the network as possible. In this
attack, the attacker tries to convince some users to leave the social network in order to reduce the
number of residual social ties. Metrics to quantify the impact of MVC attacks have been studied
in [8]. MVC is not a privacy attack, though.
While there exist several published active attacks to social graphs, there does not exist yet a
rational privacy metric for evaluating the resistance of social graphs to this type of privacy attack.
To overcome this problem, in this article we introduce (k, `)-anonymity; a privacy notion based
on k-anonymity and the metric representation of nodes in a graph. Note that, privacy notions
with the same name has been already proposed. For instance, Feder and Nabar proposed (k, `)-
anonymity where ` represents the number of common neighbors of two nodes [4]. This notion
was later generalized by Stokes and Torra in [18]. In our privacy notion, however, ` represents an
upper bound on the k-metric antidimension of the graph.
Interested readers could refer to [13, 22, 29] for further reading on privacy-preserving publi-
cation of social graphs.
3. Privacy against active attacks
In this section we define the metric representation of nodes with respect to a set of attacker
nodes S as the adversary’s background knowledge. We also introduce the resulting privacy mea-
sure, named (k, `)-anonymity, and its related mathematical problem: the k-metric antidimension.
3.1. Adversary’s background knowledge
Vulnerabilities in an anonymized social graphs are better understood once the adversary’s
knowledge has been properly modeled. This knowledge can be acquired from public information
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Figure 1: An example.
sources and through malicious actions. In practice, the adversary could even be a close friend,
which makes the publication of social network where users cannot re-identify themselves a reason-
able privacy goal.
Adversary’s background information in passive attacks is typically modeled as structural
knowledge on the network. This is a sort of global view that provides adversaries with the ability to
partition the set of nodes into equivalence classes of structurally equivalent nodes. The strongest
of those structural relations is automorphism [30]. Two vertices u and v are automorphically
equivalent if there exists an isomorphism from the graph to itself such that u maps to v. Other
types of structural relations are based on vertex degrees, connectivity, or local neighborhood.
Intuitively, structurally equivalent vertices are indistinguishable with respect to the considered
structural property.
However, adversaries controlling attacker nodes in a network are undoubtedly more powerful.
In addition to the global view, they have a local view determined by the relationship of the
attacker nodes with the network. To illustrate this let us consider the graph shown in Figure 1.
With respect to the vertex degree property, v2 and v3 are indistinguishable. They are easily
re-identifiable by either an adversary or a legitimate user owning the vertex v4 and knowing its
distance to v2 and v3, though.
A first step towards modeling such local view was given by Hay et al. [6], who defined the
concept of hub fingerprint queries. A hub is a relevant node in the network with high degree and
high centrality, and a hub fingerprint for a target node x is a vector of distances from x to hub
vertices. Although not explicitly mentioned in [6], the largest hub fingerprint for a target node x
is indeed the metric representation of x with respect to the hub vertices. We formally define this
concept as follows.
Definition 1 (Metric representation). Let G = (V,E) be a simple connected graph and dG(u, v)
be the length of the shortest path between the vertices u and v in G. For an ordered set S =
{u1, · · · , ut} of vertices in V and a vertex v, we call r(v|S) = (dG(v, u1), · · · , dG(v, ut)) the metric
representation of v with respect to S.
Similarly to Hay et al. work [6], we define the adversary’s background knowledge about a
target node u as the metric representation of u with respect to S. In this article, however, we
assume S to be any subset of attacker nodes rather than hub vertices only.
It is worth mentioning that the concept of metric representation is also the basis of two weel-
known concepts: resolving sets and metric dimension (cf. Definition 2). Both have been already
motivated by problems related to unique recognition of an intruder position in a network [17],
5
where resolving sets were called locating sets. The name “resolving set” is due to Harary and
Melter [5], who introduced the concept in 1976.
Definition 2 (Resolving set and metric dimension). Let G = (V,E) be a simple connected graph.
A set S ⊂ V (G) is said to be a resolving set for G if any pair of vertices of G have different metric
representations with respect to S. A resolving set of the smallest possible cardinality is called a
metric basis, and its cardinality the metric dimension of G.
3.2. (k, `)-anonymity
(k, `)-anonymity is a privacy measure that evolves from the adversary’s background knowledge
defined previously. It is based on the concept of k-antiresolving set defined as follows.
Definition 3 (k-antiresolving set). Let G = (V,E) be a simple connected graph and let S =
{u1, · · · , ut} be a subset of vertices of G. The set S is called a k-antiresolving set if k is the
greatest positive integer such that for every vertex v ∈ V − S there exist at least k − 1 different
vertices v1, · · · , vk−1 ∈ V − S with r(v|S) = r(v1|S) = · · · = r(vk−1|S), i.e., v and v1, · · · , vk−1
have the same metric representation with respect to S.
The following concepts derive from Definition 3, whose study is one of the goals of this article.
Definition 4 (k-metric antidimension and k-antiresolving basis). The k-metric antidimension
of a simple connected graph G = (V,E) is the minimum cardinality amongst the k-antiresolving
sets in G and is denoted by adimk(G). A k-antiresolving set of cardinality adimk(G) is called a
k-antiresolving basis for G.
It is easy to prove that if the set of attacker nodes S is a k-antiresolving set, the adversary
cannot uniquely re-identify other nodes in the network with probability higher than 1/k. However,
given that S is unknown, the privacy measure should quantify over all possible subsets S as follows.
Definition 5 ((k, `)-anonymity). A graph G meets (k, `)-anonymity with respect to active attacks
if k is the smallest positive integer such that the k-metric antidimension of G is lower than or
equal to `.
In Definition 5 the parameter k is used as a privacy threshold, whilst ` is an upper bound
on the expected number of attacker nodes in the network. Because attacker nodes are difficult to
enrol in a network without been detected [27], ` can be estimated through statistical analysis. A
fair assumption, for example, is that the number of attacker nodes is significantly lower than the
total number of nodes in the network. To further explain the role of k and ` in Definition 5 we
provide the following example result.
Theorem 1. For every n > 0 and 0 < ` < n, the graph Kn meets (n− `, `)− anonymity.
Proof. Since all the vertices in a complete graph Kn are connected, every subset S of vertices of
Kn is an (n− |S|)-antiresolving set. Therefore, the k-metric antidimension of Kn is n− k.
According to Definition 5, the k-metric antidimension should be lower than or equal to `,
which implies that k ≥ n − `. Moreover, k should be the smallest positive integer satisfying the
previous condition. Therefore, Kn holds (n− `, `)-anonymity.
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Corollary 2. A social graph Kn guarantees that a user cannot be re-identified with probability
higher than 1
n−` by an adversary controlling ` attacker nodes.
These simple and intuitive result obtained in Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 shows the role of
the privacy measure (k, `)-anonymity in privacy-preserving publication of social graphs. Before
releasing a social graph G, the goal is to find k such that G satisfies (k, `)-anonymity. To do so,
theoretical results and efficient algorithms on the k-metric antidimension of a graph need to be
investigated.
4. Computing the k-metric antidimension
Computing the k-metric antidimension of a graph seems to be a challenging problem, whose
hardness ought to be investigated. It should be remarked that its counterpart: the k-metric
dimension is an NP-complete problem [23] (and [7] for k = 1). Particularly, we observe that
any resolving set is also a 1-antiresolving set, which gives some intuitive idea on the hardness of
computing the k-metric antidimension of graphs. Thus, we address the k-metric antidimension
problem by proposing a true-biased algorithm whose success rate and computational cost can be
balanced.
4.1. A true-biased algorithm
A true-biased algorithm is always correct when it returns true, it might fail with some small
probability when its output is false. True-biased algorithms normally are Monte Carlo algorithms
with deterministic running time and randomized behavior. The algorithm we introduce in this
section resembles to a Monte Carlo algorithm in the sense that it is deterministic and has the
true-biased property. The proposed algorithm is not randomized, though.
The mathematical foundation of our algorithm requires the introduction of notation as follows.
For a given subset of vertices X ⊆ V (G), we denote ∼X : V (G)×V (G) to the symmetric, reflexive
and transitive relation satisfying that u ∼X v =⇒ r(u|X) = r(v|X). The set of equivalence
classes created by ∼X over the subset of vertices V (G) − X is denoted as CX . We deliberately
abuse notation and use ∼v and Cv instead of ∼{v} and C{v} for every vertex v ∈ V (G).
Proposition 3. Let S ⊆ V (G) and S ′ ⊆ S:
• u ∼S v =⇒ u ∼S′ v
• ∀X ∈ CS there exists X ′ ∈ CS′ such that X ⊆ X ′
• ∀X ∈ CS and ∀X ′ ∈ CS′, X ∩X ′ 6= ∅ =⇒ X ⊆ X ′
Lemma 4. Let S be a k-antiresolving set and let S ′ ⊆ S. Let Y = {X ∈ CS′ : |X| < k}, then
S ′ ∪ (⋃y∈Y y) ⊆ S.
Proof. By Proposition 3, for every X ∈ CS there exists X ′ ∈ CS′ such that X ⊆ X ′, which implies
that |X ′| ≥ |X| ≥ k due to the definition of k-antiresolving set. Consequently, |X ′| < k implies
that there does not exist X ∈ CS such that X ⊆ X ′, meaning that there does not exist X ∈ CS
such that X ∩ X ′ 6= ∅ according to Proposition 3. Therefore, X ′ ∩ (V (G) − S) = ∅ and thus
X ′ ⊆ S.
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In the spirit of Lemma 4, let f : V (G)→ V (G) be the function defined recursively as follows:
f(S) =
{
f(S ∪ (⋃y∈Y y)), if Y = {X ∈ CS : |X| < k} is not empty,
S, otherwise.
(1)
According to Lemma 4, if S is a subset of a k-antiresolving set, so is f(S). We therefore give
some useful properties of the function f in Theorem 5 below.
Theorem 5. The function defined in Equation 1 satisfies the following properties.
1. f(f(S)) = f(S)
2. S ′ ⊆ S =⇒ f(S ′) ⊆ f(S)
3. ∀S ′ ⊂ S, f(S) = f(f(S − S ′)⋃ f(S ′))
4. S ′ ⊆ f(S) =⇒ f(S ′) ⊆ f(S)
Proof. The first property comes straightforwardly from Equation 1. In order to prove the second
property, let S ′ ⊆ S and u ∈ f(S ′). If u ∈ S, then u ∈ f(S) by definition. Let us thus assume that
u /∈ S. Given that u ∈ f(S ′), there exist X ′ ∈ CS′ such that |X ′| < k and u ∈ X ′. Let X ∈ CS
such that u ∈ X. Note that, such an X exists because u /∈ S. According to Proposition 3, since
X ∩ X ′ 6= ∅ and S ′ ⊆ S, then X ⊆ X ′, which means that |X| < k and that X ⊆ f(S), which
proves the second property.
The third property can be proven by using the first property. Given that S − S ′ ⊂ S and
S ′ ⊂ S, then f(S − S ′) ⊆ f(S) and f(S ′) ⊆ f(S), hence, f(f(S − S ′)⋃ f(S ′)) ⊆ f(S). Similarly,
S−S ′ ⊆ f(S−S ′) and S ′ ⊆ f(S ′) by definition, which implies that S ⊆ f(S−S ′)⋃ f(S ′). Again,
applying the first property we obtain that f(S) ⊆ f(f(S − S ′)⋃ f(S ′)). The two results lead to
f(S) = f(f(S − S ′)⋃ f(S ′)).
Finally, the last property is proven as follows. If S ′ ⊆ f(S), then f(S ′) ⊆ f(f(S)) by applying
the second property. The proof is concluded by simply considering the first property.
The function f(.) is the basis of Algorithm 1, which aims to find a k-antiresolving set in a
graph. Algorithm 1 is an optimized version supported by Theorem 5 of the following algorithm.
Let us consider all subsets S of V (G) with cardinality lower than or equal to m. If f(S) is a
k-antiresolving set, then a positive output is provided. If not, a proof that a k-antiresolving set
does not exist is found when f(S) = V (G) for every S ⊆ V (G) such that |S| = m. Note that, this
impossibility result comes from the monotonicity of the function f , i.e., S ′ ⊆ S =⇒ f(S ′) ⊆ f(S).
Any other case leads to the unknown state where neither a proof nor a disproof of the existence
of a k-antiresolving set can be found.
Algorithm 1 can be considered a true-biased algorithm if the unknown state is regarded as a
negative result. Its computational complexity is clearly exponential in terms of m. More precisely,
for every i ∈ {2, · · · ,m} we obtain that |Ci−1| ≤ |Ci| ≤ |Ci−1|(|Ci−1| − 1)/2, because Ci is formed
by joining every pair of elements of Ci−1. This means that the computational complexity of
Algorithm 1 is determined by the size of Cm. Given that, in the worst case, the cardinality of
8
Algorithm 1 Given a positive integer k, this algorithms outputs: i) true if it finds a k-
antiresolving set, ii) false if such a set does not exist, iii) unknown when neither a k-antiresolving
set nor a proof that such a set does no exist was found.
Require: A graph G, an integer value m to control the exponential explosion, and the integer
value k.
1: Let V (G) = {v1, · · · , vN}
2: Let C1 = {f({v1}), · · · , f({vN})}
3: if ∃S ∈ C1 that is a k-antiresolving set then return true
4: for h = 2 to m do
5: Let Ch be an empty set
6: for i = 1 to |Ch−1| do
7: Let Si be the ith element of Ch−1
8: for j = i+ 1 to |Ch−1| do
9: Let Sj be the jth element of Ch−1
10: if Si 6⊆ Sj and Sj 6⊆ Si then
11: S = f(Si
⋃
Sj)
12: if S is a k-antiresolving set then return true
13: Add S to Ch
14: if ∀S ∈ Cm, S = V (G) then return false
15: else return unknown
Cm quadratically increases with respect to Cm−1, we obtain that the worst-case computational
complexity of this algorithm is O(N2m−1).
Although O(N2m−1) is double exponential in terms of m, when m << N it becomes signifi-
cantly lower than the computational complexity of a brute force algorithm that considers the 2N
subsets of V (G). For example, for m = 1, m = 2, and m = 3, the computational complexity
becomes O(N), O(N2), and O(N4), respectively. Moreover, given that the search space mono-
tonically increases with m, the accuracy of the algorithm also increases with m. In this sense, m
provides a trade-off between false negatives and computational cost.
It is worth remarking that a theoretical lower bound, although not considered in the analysis,
of the computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(N3), which is the computational complex-
ity of the classic Floyd-Warshall algorithm required to compute the metric representation of all
vertices. This prevents our method to be used on large graphs even when m = 1. In this case,
more efficient implementations of both Algorithm 1 and the Floyd-Warshall algorithm ought to
be considered, e.g., [19].
Algorithm 1 can be adapted to find a k-antiresolving basis rather than a k-antiresolving
set. To that aim, we rely on Proposition 6 below. Proposition 6 gives a sufficient condition for
the presence of a k-antiresolving basis. This implies just a small modification to Algorithm 1.
In particular, the conditional statements in lines 3 and 12 should take into account that such
sufficient condition is satisfied. The full pseudo-code considering this modification is presented in
Algorithm 2.
Proposition 6. Let S be the subset of smaller cardinality in V (G) such that f(S) is a k-
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antiresolving set. Then, f(S) is a k-antiresolving basis if ∀S ′ ⊆ V (G) such that |S ′| = |S| it
follows that |f(S)| ≤ |f(S ′)|.
Algorithm 2 Given a positive integer k, this algorithms outputs: i) true if a k-antiresolving
basis is found, ii) false if a k-antiresolving basis does not exist, iii) unknown when neither a
k-antiresolving basis nor a proof that it does not exist was found.
Require: A graph G, an integer value m to control the exponential explosion, and the integer
value k.
1: Let V (G) = {v1, · · · , vN}
2: Let C1 = {f({v1}), · · · , f({vN})}
3: Let minSet = min(|f({v1})|, · · · , |f({vN})|)
4: if ∃S ∈ C1 such that S is a k-antiresolving set and |S| ≤ minSet then return true
5: for h = 2 to m do
6: Let Ch be an empty set
7: for i = 1 to |Ch−1| do
8: Let Si be the ith element of Ch−1
9: for j = i+ 1 to |Ch−1| do
10: Let Sj be the jth element of Ch−1
11: if Si 6⊆ Sj and Sj 6⊆ Si then
12: Add f(Si
⋃
Sj) to Ch
13: Let minSet be the minimum cardinality of a set in Ch
14: if ∃S ∈ C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ch such that S is a k-antiresolving set and |S| ≤ minSet then return
true
15: if ∀S ∈ Cm, S = V (G) then return false
16: else return unknown
4.2. Empirical evaluation on synthetic graphs
In order to show the feasibility of both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, we ran experiments
considering m ∈ {1, 2, 3} and random graphs as input. The aim of the experiments is to pro-
vide statistically sound data on the ratio between positive, negative, and unknown results of the
proposed algorithms. Further below in this section we also show results on real-life social graphs.
A random graph is created by choosing integer values uniformly distributed in the interval
[k + 2, 100] as the number of vertices N ; where k is a privacy threshold. The number of edges
also distributes uniformly in the interval [0, N × (N − 1)/2], and the edges are added randomly
to the graph. For each pair (m, k) ∈ {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, we created 10 000 random
graphs and executed Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 in order to look for a k-antiresolving set and
a k-antiresolving basis, respectively.
The success rate of both algorithms considering m ∈ {1, 2, 3} is shown in Figure 2. We define
a success as either a positive or a negative result, i.e., whenever a k-antiresolving set (basis) or a
proof that it does not exist is found. According to Figure 2, both algorithms perform poorly for
m = 1. However, when m = 2 they already achieve a success rate above 80%, which is further
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Figure 2: Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) depicts the success rates of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively. The
considered values of m are {1, 2, 3}, while k varies from 1 to 8.
improved by the more computationally demanding versions of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 that
consider m = 3.
The difference between Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) suggests, as expected, that finding a
k-antiresolving basis is harder than finding a k-antiresolving set. Notwithstanding, Algorithm 2
performs above 80% when m = 2 and m = 3. It is also worth remarking that, even though Figure 2
hints that the success rate of both algorithms monotonically decreases with k, our algorithms have
100% of success rate if k is equal to the order of the graph. This is because ∀u ∈ V (G)∀X ∈
Cu(|X| < |V (G)|) and, thus, all the nodes in the graph should be contained in a k-antiresolving
set according to Lemma 4.
In the previous section we provided a theoretical impossibility result whereby a graph can
be proven to not contain a k-antiresolving set. In Figure 3, we show that such impossibility
result can be achieved by random graphs; with small probability though. It seems also that the
percentage of negative results monotonically increases with k. Indeed, it is easy to prove that this
percentage reaches its minimum (0%) and maximum (100%) when k takes its minimum (k = 1)
and maximum (k = N) value, respectively. However, proving the monotonicity of the percentage
of negative results with respect to k looks challenging and cumbersome. Figure 3 also shows that
the increase of the success rate of both algorithms when m grows is due to an increase on both
the number of positive and negative results.
4.3. Empirical evaluation on real-life social graphs
This section ends with the evaluation of two real-life social graphs with respect to the proposed
privacy measure. The first graph, named Facebook graph in what follows, consists of 10 ego-
networks from Facebook [10]. It contains 4039 users, 88234 edges, and 193 circles. The second
graph describes an online community of students at the University of California [14]. In total,
1899 students were registered in the network and 13838 links were created. We refer to this graph
as Panzarasa graph.
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Figure 3: Six charts showing the ratio of true, false, and unknown results provided by Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2
on different values form ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Charts at the left are devoted to the algorithm aimed at finding a k-antiresolving
set, charts at the right consider the algorithm that looks for a k-antiresolving basis.
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Both graphs have been analyzed in order to determine the values of k and ` such that they
(k, `)-anonymity. Taking into account the previously presented empirical results on synthetic data,
we used for the analyses Algorithm 2 with m = 2 as a good trade-off between performance and
success rate. The results are as follows.
The Panzarasa graph contains a 1-antiresolving basis of size 1. This means that this graph does
not satisfy (k, `)-anonymity for k > 1 unless ` < 1, which is a meaningless scenario. Similarly, the
k-metric antidimension of the Facebook graph is 1 for k = 1. Hence, it satisfies (1, 1)-anonymity
only; the lowest privacy guarantee with respect to our privacy measure.
Our results show that neither the Panzarasa nor the Facebook graph provide privacy guar-
antees against active attack. This is not surprising since these graphs have not been anonymized
to prevent any type of structural attack. Future work thus should be oriented to anonymization
methods that consider (k, `)-anonymity as a privacy goal.
5. Mathematical properties on the k-metric antidimension of graphs
In the next two sections we provide some primary theoretical results on the k-metric antidi-
mension problem. We focus on giving mathematical properties that, supported by the results in
Section 4, can determine or bound the k-metric antidimension for some families of graphs. In
particular in this section, we study the k-metric antidimension of cycles, paths, complete bipartite
graphs, and other graph families satisfying some specific conditions. To do so, we first observe
some basic properties of k-antiresolving sets, which will be further used.
Observation 1.
(i) Any resolving set is also a 1-antiresolving set.
(ii) There does not exist k > 1 such that all the vertices of a graph form a k-antiresolving set.
(iii) There does not exist any n-antiresolving set in a graph of order n.
(iv) Not for every graph G of order n and every k < n, there exist a k-antiresolving set in G.
For instance, if G is a path graph, for k ≥ 3 there does not exist a k-antiresolving set in G.
In order to continue with our study we need to introduce some terminology and notation.
For a graph G and a vertex v ∈ V (G), the set NG(v) = {u ∈ V : uv ∈ E(G)} is the open
neighborhood of v and the set NG[v] = NG(v) ∪ {v} is the closed neighborhood of v. Two vertices
x, y are called (false) true twins if (NG(x) = NG(y)) NG[x] = NG[y]. In this sense, a vertex x is
a twin if there exists y 6= x such that they are either true or false twins. The diameter of G is
defined as D(G) = maxu,v∈V {dG(u, v)}.
As mentioned before, not for every integer k it is possible to find a k-antiresolving set in a
graph G. Thus, it is desirable to analyze first the interval of suitable values for k satisfying that
G contains at least one k-antiresolving set. According to Definition 3 we present the following
concept, which is relevant in the study of the k-metric antidimension of graphs.
Definition 6 (k-metric antidimensional graph). A simple connected graph G = (V,E) is k-metric
antidimensional, if k is the largest integer such that G contains a k-antiresolving set.
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5.1. k-metric antidimensional graphs
In order to study the k-metric antidimension of graphs, we first focus into obtaining the values
of k for which a given graph is k-metric antidimensional. First notice that any graph G is always
k-metric antidimensional for some k ≥ 1, and a natural upper bound for k which makes that G
would be k-metric antidimensional is clearly the maximum degree of the graph, since the number
of vertices at distance one from any vertex is at most the maximum degree of the graph.
Observation 2. If G is a connected k-metric antidimensional graph of maximum degree ∆, then
1 ≤ k ≤ ∆.
Since the maximum degree of a graph is at most the order of the graph minus one, a particular
case of the above result is the next one.
Remark 7. If G is any connected k-metric antidimensional graph of order n, then 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1.
Moreover, G is (n− 1)-metric antidimensional if and only if G has maximum degree n− 1.
Proof. The upper bound is a particular case of Remark 2. Now, it is straightforward to observe
that if v is a vertex of G of degree n− 1, then for every vertex u,w 6= v it follows that r(u|{v}) =
r(w|{v}) = 1, i.e., every vertex different from v has the same metric representation with respect
to {v}. Thus, {v} is a (n − 1)-antiresolving set, since there exists no n-antiresolving sets in G.
Thus, G is (n− 1)-metric antidimensional.
On the contrary, we assume that G is (n−1)-metric antidimensional. Hence, if S is a (n−1)-
antiresolving set, then |S| = 1. Thus, the only possibility is that S is formed by a single vertex
and that every vertex is adjacent to it.
To continue with our study we need some extra notation. The eccentricity (v) of a vertex v
in a connected graph G is the maximum length of a shortest path between v and any other vertex
u of G. Notice that the maximum of the eccentricities of any vertex of G is the diameter of G and
the minimum of the eccentricities is the radius of G. For more information on vertex eccentricity
in graphs, see for instance [21]. Figure 4 shows a graph G and a table with the eccentricities of all
its vertices. Given a vertex u of a graph G, we consider the following local parameter. For every
i ∈ {1, ..., (u)}, let di(u) = {v ∈ V (G) : d(v, u) = i}. Now, for every u ∈ V (G), let
φ(u) = min
1≤i≤(u)
{|di(u)|}.
and for any graph G, let φ(G) = maxv∈V (G){φ(v)}. The table and the graph of Figure 4 clarify
the notation above.
Theorem 8. Any connected graph G is k-metric antidimensional for some k ≥ φ(G).
Proof. Assume x is a vertex of degree at least two in G such that φ(G) = φ(x). Thus, for any
vertex y 6= x, there exist at least φ(x) − 1 vertices v1, v2, ....vφ(G)−1 in V (G) − {x, y} such that
d(y, x) = d(v1, x) = ... = d(vφ(T )−1, x). Moreover, since φ(G) = φ(x), there exists at least one
vertex y′ such that there are exactly φ(G) − 1 different vertices satisfying the above mentioned.
So, {x} is a φ(x)-antiresolving set and G is k-metric antidimensional for some k ≥ φ(G).
Now, notice that if a graph G is a 1-metric antidimensional, then every subset of vertices S
ought to be a 1-antiresolving set, implying that adim(G) = 1. According to that fact, in this
work we are mainly interested in those graphs being k-metric antidimensional for some k ≥ 2. An
example of a graph being 1-metric antidimensional is for instance the path graph of even order.
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v6
v4
v2
v1
v7
v5
v3
vi (vi) d1(vi) d2(vi) d3(vi) φ(vi)
v1 3 {2, 3} {4, 5} {6, 7} 2
v2 3 {1, 3, 4} {5, 6} {7} 1
v3 3 {1, 2, 5} {4, 7} {6} 1
v4 2 {2, 5, 6} {1, 3, 7} ∅ 3
v5 2 {2, 4, 7} {1, 3, 6} ∅ 3
v6 3 {4, 7} {2, 5} {1, 3} 2
v7 3 {5, 6} {3, 4} {1, 2} 2
Figure 4: Eccentricities of vertices of a graph G and a table which shows that φ(G) = 3.
5.2. Graphs that are k-metric antidimensional for some k ≥ 2
To begin with the description of some families of graphs being k-metric antidimensional for
some k ≥ 2 we define the radius and the center of a graph as follows. The radius r(G) of G is
the minimum eccentricity of any vertex in G. The center of G is the set S of vertices of G having
eccentricity equal to the radius of G.
Remark 9. If the center of a graph G is only one vertex, then G is k-metric antidimensional for
some k ≥ 2.
Proof. Let v be the center of G. Hence, there exist two diametral vertices u,w such that dG(v, u) =
dG(v, w) = (v) = r(G). Since v has eccentricity r(G), there is no vertex z 6= u,w in G such that
dG(v, z) > dG(v, u) = dG(v, w). Thus, it follows that for any vertex x 6= v there exists at least
a vertex y belonging to the u − w path such that dG(x, v) = dG(y, v). Therefore, {v} is a k-
antiresolving set in G for some k ≥ 2.
If a path graph has odd order, then its center is formed by only one vertex. Also, for every
vertex of any path, there exists at most other different vertex having equal distance to a third
vertex of the path. Thus, it is clear the following consequence of the Remark above.
Corollary 10. If a path Pn has odd order, then it is 2-metric antidimensional.
Another example of 2-metric antidimensional are the cycle graphs as we next see.
Remark 11. Any cycle graph Cn is 2-metric antidimensional.
Proof. We assume first that n is odd. Let v be any vertex of Cn. Hence, for any vertex x 6= v of Cn,
there exists only one y 6= x, v such that dCn(x, v) = dCn(y, v). Thus, {v} is a 2-antiresolving set in
Cn. Assume now that n is even and let {u,w} be any two diametral vertices of Cn. We observe
that for any vertex x 6= u,w of Cn, there exists only one y 6= x, u, w such that dCn(x, u) = dCn(y, u)
and dCn(x,w) = dCn(y, w). Thus, {u,w} is a 2-antiresolving set in Cn.
On the other hand, there does not exists k > 2 such that Cn contains a k-metric antiresolving
set, since for any vertex of Cn, there exists at most another different vertex having equal distance
to a third vertex of the path. Therefore, Cn is 2-metric antidimensional.
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If the vertices of a set S are pairwise twins in a graph G, then it is clear that they have the
same distance to every other vertex x /∈ S. So, V (G)− S is a |S|-antiresolving set for G. Hence,
the following result.
Observation 3. If the vertices of a set S are pairwise twins in a graph G, then G is k-metric
antidimensional for some k ≥ |S|.
Complete bipartite graph3 are special kind of graphs, since they have a bipartition of the
vertex set in which all the vertices belonging to one of the sets of the bipartition are pairwise twin
vertices. Let Kr,t be a complete bipartite graph. Next we analyze the suitable values k making a
complete bipartite graph k-metric antidimensional.
Remark 12. Any complete bipartite graph Kr,t with r ≥ t is r-metric antidimensional.
Proof. Let U and V be the two disjoint sets of Kr,t with |U | = r and |V | = t. Notice that U
(respectively V ) is a set of pairwise twin vertices. Thus, by Observation 3 we have that Kr,t
is k-metric antidimensional for some k ≥ |U | = r. Suppose that k ≥ r + 1 and let S be a k-
antiresolving set for Kr,t. Since every vertex of Kr,t has distance either one or two to any other
vertex of Kr,t it is not possible to find k − 1 vertices having the same distance to every vertex of
S, a contradiction. So, k = r and the proof is complete.
5.3. The k-metric antidimension of graphs
In this subsection we compute the k′-metric antidimension of some graphs which were already
described to be k-metric antidimensional for some value k ≥ k′. It is clear that the first natural
bound which follows for the k-metric antidimension of a graph of order n is adimk(G) ≤ n − k.
Such a bound is tight. It is achieved, for instance, for the complete bipartite graphs Kr,t as we
can see at next by taking the case t < k ≤ r.
Proposition 13. Let r, t be two positive integers with r ≥ t.
1. If t < k ≤ r, then adimk(Kr,t) = r + t− k.
2. If 1 < k ≤ t, then adimk(Kr,t) = r + t− 2k.
Proof. From Proposition 12 we know that Kr,t is a r-metric antidimensional graph. Let U and
V be the two partite sets of Kr,t with |U | = r and |V | = t. We assume first that t < k ≤ r.
Let A ⊆ U with |A| = k and let be S = (V ∪ U) − A. Notice that if k = r, then A = U and
so, S = V . Since any vertex v /∈ S (or equivalently v ∈ A) is adjacent to every vertex of V and
it has distance two to every vertex in U − A, we have that all the vertices of A have the same
metric representation with respect to S. As |A| = k, it follows that S is a k-antiresolving set and
adimk(Kr,t) ≤ r+ t− k. Now, suppose adimk(Kr,t) < r+ t− k and let S ′ be a k-antiresolving set
for Kr,t. So, we have either one of the following situations.
3A graph G is complete bipartite if its vertex set can be divided into two disjoint sets U and V such that every
vertex in U is adjacent to every vertex in V and no more.
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• There exist more than k vertices of U not in S ′. Hence, for any vertex u ∈ U −S ′ there exist
at least k vertices not in S ′ which, together with u, have the same metric representation
with respect to S ′. So, S ′ is not a k-antiresolving set, but a k′-antiresolving set for some
k′ ≥ k + 1, a contradiction.
• There exists at least one vertex of V not in S ′. It is a direct contradiction, since |V | = t < k.
Therefore, we obtain that adimk(Kr,t) = r + t− k.
On the other hand, we assume that 1 < k ≤ r. Let X ⊆ U with |X| = k, let Y ⊆ V with
|Y | = k and let Q = (V −Y )∪ (U −X). Hence, for any vertex v /∈ Q (or equivalently v ∈ X ∪Y ),
there exist exactly k − 1 vertices, such that all of them, together with v, have the same metric
representation with respect to Q. Thus, Q is a k-antiresolving set and adimk(Kr,t) ≤ r + t− 2k.
Now, suppose that adimk(G) < r + t− 2k and let Q′ be a k-antiresolving set in Kr,t. Hence,
either there exist more than k vertices of U not in Q′ or there exist more than k vertices of V
not in Q′. As above, in any of both possibilities we obtain that Q′ is not k-antiresolving set, but
a k′-antiresolving set for some k′ ≥ k + 1, a contradiction. As a consequence, we obtain that
adimk(Kr,t) = r + t− 2k.
Next we study the k-metric antidimension of some other families of basic graphs. According
to Remark 11 we know that the cycles Cn are 2-metric antidimensional and, by Corollary 10, that
the paths Pn are 2-metric antidimensional only in the case n is odd. Next we compute its 2-metric
antidimension.
Proposition 14. Let n ≥ 2 be an integer. Then
adim2(P2n+1) = 1 and adim2(Cn) =
{
1, if n is odd,
2, if n is even.
Proof. If v is the center of a path P2n+1, then for any other vertex u 6= v there exists exactly one
vertex w 6= v, u such that w, u have the same metric representation with respect to {v}. Thus
adim2(P2n+1) = 1.
Suppose n is even and let u,w be two diametral vertices in Cn. We observe that for any vertex
x 6= u,w there exists exactly one vertex y 6= x, u, w in Cn, such that x, y have the same metric
representation with respect to {u,w}. Thus, adim2(C2n) ≤ 2. To see that adim2(C2n) = 2 we can
observe that any set with only one vertex h is not a 1-antiresolving set, since for the vertex f being
diametral with h there does not exist any other vertex f ′ having the same metric representation
with respect to {h}. On the other hand, if n is odd and a is any vertex of Cn, then we can check
that for any vertex b 6= a, there exists exactly one vertex c 6= a, b, such that b, c have the same
metric representation with respect to {a}. Thus, adim2(C2n+1) = 1.
6. The particular case of trees
Let T be a tree and let u be a vertex of T of degree at least two. Let v be a neighbor of
u. A v-branch of T at u is the subtree Tu,v obtained from the union of all length maximal paths
beginning in u, passing throughout v and finishing at a vertex of degree one in T . Given a y-
branch Tx,y at x, we say that ξ(Tx,y) is the eccentricity of the vertex x in the y-branch Tx,y. Two
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branches Tx,y1 and Tx,y2 at x are ξx-equivalent if ξ(Tx,y1) = ξ(Tx,y2). For every vertex x of T , let
ξ(x) represents the maximum number of pairwise ξx-equivalent branches at x and let lξ(x) equals
the length of any ξx-equivalent branch. Now, for any tree T , we define the following parameter:
ξ(T ) = max
x∈V (T ):δ(x)≥2
{ξ(x)}.
An example which helps to clarify the above definitions is given in Figure 5. There we have a
tree T satisfying the following. The vertex v5 has 4 branches: Tv5,v6 , Tv5,v10 , Tv5,v15 and Tv5,v4 . For
instance V (Tv5,v15) = {v5, v15, v16, v17, v11, v18, v14, v13}. We observe that ξ(Tv5,v6) = 2, ξ(Tv5,v10) =
1, ξ(Tv5,v15) = 3 and ξ(Tv5,v4) = 4. So, v5 has no ξv5-equivalent branches and ξ(v5) = 0. Similarly,
it can be noticed that v3 and v15 are the only vertices of T which have equivalent branches. That is,
Tv3,v2 and Tv3,v9 are ξv3-equivalent, since ξ(Tv3,v2) = ξ(Tv3,v9) = 2. Thus ξ(v3) = 2 and lξ(v3) = 2.
Analogously, ξ(Tv15,v11) = ξ(Tv15,v10) = ξ(Tv15,v14) = 2 and ξ(v15) = 3, lξ(v15) = 2. Therefore
ξ(T ) = 3.
v1
v8
v12
v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
v9 v19 v10 v11 v18
v13 v14 v15 v16 v17
Figure 5: A 3-metric antidimensional tree T .
Now, for the particular case of trees, we next use the definition of φ(G) already presented in
Section 5. As an example, for the tree of Figure 5 we have that, for instance, φ(v3) = 3, φ(v4) = 3
and φ(v5) = 2. Also, some calculations give that φ(T ) = 3.
Now, with the definitions above we present the following result.
Theorem 15. Any tree T is k-metric antidimensional for some k ≥ max{φ(T ), ξ(T )}.
Proof. From Theorem 8 it follows that k ≥ φ(T ). Now, let x be a vertex of degree at least two in T
such that ξ(T ) = ξ(x). Hence, there exist ξ(T ) disjoint paths beginning in x, passing throughout
a vertex yj (neighbor of x), and ending in a vertex wj of degree one in T with j ∈ {1, ..., ξ(T )}.
Moreover, every yj-branch Tx,yj does not contain any other vertex further away from x than wj.
We consider now the set
A = V (T )−
ξ(T )⋃
i=1
V (Tx,yj)
⋃{x}.
Notice that for any vertex u 6∈ A, there exist at least ξ(T ) − 1 different vertices v1, v2, ....vξ(T )−1
in V (T ) − A such that d(u, z) = d(v1, z) = ... = d(vξ(T )−1, z) for every z ∈ A. Moreover, since
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v1
v8
v12
v20
v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
v9 v19 v10 v11 v18
v13 v14 v15 v16 v17
v21 v22 v23 v24 v25 v26 v27
Figure 6: A 5-metric antidimensional tree T .
ξ(T ) = ξ(x), it follows that there exists a vertex u′ such that there are exactly ξ(T )− 1 different
vertices satisfying the above mentioned. Thus, A is a ξ(T )-antiresolving set and, as a consequence,
T is k-metric antidimensional for some k ≥ ξ(T ).
Therefore we obtain that T is k-metric antidimensional for some k ≥ max{φ(T ), ξ(T )} and
the proof is complete.
According to Theorem 15, we conclude that the tree T in Figure 5 is k-metric antidimensional
for some k ≥ 3, since φ(T ) = 3 and ξ(T ) = 3; that tree is indeed 3-antidimensional. If we add some
extra vertices to this mentioned tree, like in Figure 6, we obtain that φ(T ) = 5 (since φ(v4) = 5),
and it remains ξ(T ) = 3. Thus, this new tree is k-metric antidimensional for some k ≥ 5, and by
Remark 2 we have that k = 5.
Notice that ξ(T ) > φ(T ) holds for some trees. For instance, if we take a star graph S1,n,
n ≥ 4, and we add an extra vertex x connected by an edge with one leaf y of S1,n, then we have
a tree T such that φ(T ) = 2 (for the vertex y, φ(y) = 2) and ξ(T ) = n− 1.
Moreover, there are graphs in which the bound of Theorem 15 is not achieved. An example
of this appears in Figure 7. There we have a tree T such that ξ(T ) = 3 (ξ(v7) = 3) and φ(T ) = 3
(φ(v12) = 3). Nevertheless the set {v10, v11, v12, v13, v14, v18, v19} is a 4-antiresolving set.
v1
v7
v15
v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14
v16 v17 v18 v19
Figure 7: The set {v10, v11, v12, v13, v14, v18, v19} is a 4-metric antiresolving set.
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6.1. The k-metric antidimension of trees
Once we have a lower bound for the integer k′ for which a given tree T is k′-metric antidi-
mensional, we are able to compute its k-metric antidimension for a suitable value k ≤ k′. We first
notice that if T is 1-metric antidimensional, then any 1-metric antiresolving set is an standard
resolving set, as defined in [5, 17] and, in such a case, adim1(T ) = dim(T ). Since it is not our goal
to study such a case, from now on we consider only those trees being k-metric antidimensional for
some k ≥ 2.
Remark 16. Let T be a k-metric antidimensional tree and let x ∈ V (T ) such that φ(x) = t. If
t ≥ 2, then adimt(T ) = 1.
Proof. Since t ≥ 2, then for every vertex y 6= x, there exist at least t − 1 vertices v1, ..., vt−1 ∈
V (T ) − {x, y} such that d(y, x) = d(v1, x) = ... = d(vφ(T )−1, x). Moreover, there exists a vertex
y′ such that there are exactly t − 1 different vertices satisfying the above mentioned. Thus, {x}
is a t-metric antiresolving set and, as a consequence, adimt(T ) = 1, since on the other hand,
adimt(G) ≥ 1 for any graph G.
Corollary 17. For any tree T such that φ(T ) ≥ 2, adimφ(T )(T ) = 1.
According to the results above, it remains to study the k-metric dimension of trees for the
case in which every vertex v of T satisfies that φ(v) 6= k. To do so, we need to introduce some
notations.
We denote by Ξk(T ), for some k ∈ {2, ..., ξ(T )}, the set of vertices v ∈ V (T ) such that
ξ(v) ≥ k. Now, for every v ∈ Ξk(T ), let
N<lξ(v) = {x ∈ V (Tv,u) : u ∈ N(v) and ξ(Tv,u) < lξ(v)} − {v},
and for the set of vertices u ∈ N(v) such that ξ(Tv,u) = lξ(v), let Nk=lξ(v) be the maximum
cardinality among all possible sets obtained as the union of k vertex sets of the branches Tv,u where
u ∈ N(v) minus the vertex v itself. As an example, we consider the tree of Figure 5. For k = 2,
there we have that Ξk(T ) = {v3, v15}, N<lξ(v3) = {v12}, N<lξ(v15) = ∅, N2=lξ(v3) = {v1, v2, v8, v9}
and N2=lξ(v15) = {v13, v14, v16, v17} (notice that N2=lξ(v15) can be different from this set, but it
always has five vertices).
With this definition we are able to present the following result, where we analyze only those
graphs being k′-metric antidimensional for k′ = max{φ(T ), ξ(T )}.
Theorem 18. Let T be a k′-metric antidimensional of order n with k′ = max{φ(T ), ξ(T )}. Then
for any k ≤ k′,
adimk(T ) ≤ n−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
v∈Ξi(T )
N<lξ(v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
v∈Ξi(T )
Nk=lξ(v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Proof. We consider a set S ⊂ V (T ) given by
S = V (T )−
⋃
v∈Ξk(T )
N<lξ(v)−
⋃
v∈Ξk(T )
Nk=lξ(v).
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y
Figure 8: A tree T3 of the family F . The set {x, y} is a 3-metric antiresolving set of minimum cardinality.
In this sense, for any vertex x /∈ S, there exists at least k− 1 vertices y1, y2, ..., yk−1 not in S such
that d(x,w) = d(y1, w) = ... = d(yk−1, w) for every w ∈ S. Moreover, if there exists at least one
vertex x′ /∈ S for which there are exactly k − 1 vertices not in S satisfying the above mentioned,
then S is a k-metric antiresolving set and the result follows since the cardinality of S is given by
the formula of the theorem. On the contrary, if such a vertex does not exist, then S is a k′′-metric
antiresolving set for G for some k′′ ≥ k. Since in this case, adimk′′(G) ≥ adimk(G) we obtain the
result.
Consider now the example of Figure 5. According to the result above, we have that the set
S = {v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v10, v11, v15, v18, v19} is a 2-metric antiresolving set for such a tree T and
adim2(T ) ≤ 10. Nevertheless, since φ(v5) = 2, from Remark 16 we have that adim2(T ) = 1. Next
we present a family of trees, where the bound of Theorem 18 is achieved.
We consider the family F of trees Tr satisfying the following conditions.
• The center of Tr is formed by two adjacent vertices, say x, y.
• Tr is “rooted” in x, y.
• Tr is a complete r-ary tree (each vertex of degree greater than one has r children)
• Any two leaves being descendants of the same root (x or y), have the same distance to this
root.
An example of a tree T3 of the family F is given in Figure 8.
It is straightforward to observe that ξ(Tr) = r and φ(Tr) = r + 1. Thus, Tr is k
′-metric
antidimensional for some k ≥ r + 1, and by Remark 2 we have that k = r + 1. Now on, we
compute the r-metric antidimension of Tr. According to the construction of the family F , we see
that the root vertices x, y of a tree Tr ∈ F satisfy that x, y ∈ Ξi(Tr). Also, N<lξ(x) = N<lξ(y) = ∅
and the sets N r=lξ(x), N
r
=lξ
(y) are formed by the set of all their corresponding descendants (this
fact makes unnecessary to consider other vertices of Tr). As a consequence of this, by Theorem
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18 we have that {x, y} is a r-metric antiresolving set and adimr(Tr) ≤ 2. Since, for any non-leaf
vertex u of Tr satisfies that φ(u) = 4, we have that any singleton vertex (being not a leaf) is a
(r + 1)-metric antiresolving set. Thus, adimr(Tr) ≥ 2 and we have that adimr(Tr) = 2, which
makes that the bound of Theorem 18 is tight.
7. Discussion and conclusions
In this article we have introduced a new problem in Graph Theory (the k-metric antidimension
problem) that resembles to the well-known metric dimension problem. The k-metric antidimension
is the basis of our novel privacy measure (k, `)-anonymity. This measures quantifies the level of
privacy offered by an outsourced social graph against active attacks. Consequently, privacy-
preserving methods for the publication of social networks ought to consider (k, `)-anonymity as
one of their privacy goal.
We have proposed a true-biased algorithm aimed at finding both a k-antiresolving set and a
k-antiresolving basis in a graph. The algorithm, although computationally demanding, reached
a success rate above 80% during the executed experiments when looking for a k-antiresolving
basis. We expect future experiments to be conducted over real-life social graphs so that privacy-
preserving methods satisfying (k, `)-anonymity can be empirically evaluated in terms of utility
and resistance to active attacks.
We have also began the study of mathematical properties of the k-antiresolving sets and the
k-metric antidimension of graphs. We have studied some particular graph families like cycles,
paths, complete bipartite graphs and trees. For instance, we have obtained that for any path Pn
of odd order, adim2(Pn) = 1 and for any cycle Cn it follows that adim2(Cn) = 1 if n is odd, and
adim2(Cn) = 2 if n is even. Also, for every complete bipartite graph Kr,t, adimk(Kr,t) = r+ t− k
if t < k ≤ r, and adimk(Kr,t) = r + t − 2k if 1 < k ≤ t. For the case of trees we have presented
a tight lower bound for its k-metric antidimension in terms of the order of the tree and the order
of some subtrees satisfying some specific conditions. We have also described an infinite family of
k-ary trees which achieve this bound.
Finally, this article opens new and challenging open problems related to the k-metric antidi-
mension of graphs and the privacy concept (k, `)-anonymity. For instance, it would be interesting
to characterize the family of graphs such that they are 1-metric antidimensional, as well as looking
for a close relationship between the k-metric antidimension and the k-metric dimension of a graph.
In particular, those families of graphs that resemble to social graphs must be considered. The
computational complexity of computing the k-metric antidimension should also be addressed. In
case the problem is NP-complete, efficient heuristics and privacy-preserving methods need to be
developed so as to compute the k-metric antidimension and, ultimately, transform a social graph
into a (k, `)-anonymous graph for given values of k and `.
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